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What Is America's Foreign Policy

AND

Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks

RADIO BROADCASTS BY
THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

February 24, 1945, *and*
March 3, 1945

The first two of a series of seven broadcasts on the subject of "Building the Peace", sponsored by the Department of State and presented over the facilities of the National Broadcasting Company on February 24 and March 3, 1945, are printed in this pamphlet.

The five future programs will be on these subjects:

World trade and world peace

What about the liberated areas?

What about the enemy countries?

Our Good Neighbors in Latin America

The State Department itself.

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What Is America's Foreign Policy?

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Announcer for NBC

Voice No. 1: Just what is America's foreign policy?

Voice No. 2: What I want to know is, do we have a foreign policy?

Voice No. 3: What does all this have to do with me, anyhow?

ANNOUNCER: (*Pause*) Good questions, all of them, and the answers are *important*, and vitally concern *you.* We'll deal with them in this, the first in a new series of programs on our foreign policy, arranged by the NBC University of the Air. This evening, and for the next six programs in this series, we will present top officials of our State Department, who will talk about the problems of *Building the Peace.* The Secretary of State—Edward R. Stettinius, Jr.—will introduce this evening's program from Mexico City. Immediately following, Assistant Secretaries of State Dean Acheson and Archibald MacLeish will discuss American foreign policy, with special reference to the Crimea Conference, answering many questions of importance to your future and mine. Now to Mexico City and Secretary of State Stettinius. Come in, Mr. Stettinius.[1]

[1] Owing to technical communication difficulties between Washington and Mexico City, the speech of the Secretary of State was read from Washington by Assistant Secretary MacLeish.

STETTINIUS: It is particularly appropriate that a series of broadcasts on the building of the peace should be opened from a conference of American nations in Mexico City. This conference propitiously follows the meeting in the Crimea which revealed the broad pattern of aims and purposes of the nations associated in the war and precedes the United Nations meeting to be held in San Francisco.

We Americans of all the American republics have lived our lives—have lived our histories—in the discovery and the building of new worlds.

We know that worlds can be discovered such as men in older continents had never imagined. We know that worlds can be built such as men in other ages had never seen. We are not frightened, therefore, or discouraged, or dismayed when we are brought face to face with the necessity of creating something new—an effective world organization.

Delegates from the American republics are assembled in this beautiful city of Mexico to strengthen the fraternal ties developed through many decades, and to improve the inter-American system of relations.

They are engaged in the serious business of considering how their friendship and unity of purpose may best contribute to a world organization for peace, security, and a better way of life. This meeting affords a forum where the ideas and opinions of the American republics may be given expression.

Already we have offered to the conference resolutions intended to accomplish the more effective cooperation of the American republics within the proposed new world structure.

Our entire American past is a past of bold explorations, of hardy settlement, of arduous construction, of difficult beginnings. We are accustomed to labors without precedent. We are hardened to the seeming impossible. We know how to do what was never done before. We have brought a vast and untamed continent to human order within a space of time which would seem impossible to those who measure what can be done in the future by

what has been done before. In the Americas we have sought to foster a spirit of neighborliness, which is indispensable to a new society of mankind.

We have good reason, therefore, for approaching the greatest labor of human history with such high hopes, with such unshakable determination. We have not listened in the past, and we will not listen in the future, to voices of frustration and defeat which tell us that we cannot do what we believe we must do. There is nothing in our American history that needed doing which did not find the men to do it.

But this labor of the construction of a peaceful world is not a labor to be spoken of in terms of hope and purposes only. Much has already been accomplished. Four nations have agreed among themselves on proposals for the organization of a peaceful world, and those proposals had been submitted to the people of the earth for their consideration. Never before has a proposal worked out by specialists and experts and agreed upon by representatives of several nations been submitted to such searching examination by the peoples of the world before its submission to a formal conference.

At the San Francisco conference, all of the United Nations will take part in setting up the permanent machinery for international security. They will participate as independent sovereign states. Sovereign equality of nations, large and small, is a basic principle underlying the Proposals.

Those Proposals not only embrace the sovereign equality of nations, but they also intend that the power of all nations shall be used in the interests of world peace, security, and freedom. Only on such a foundation may we realize the aspiration of mankind for a new and better world, with greater opportunity and well-being for all people.

The fact that the nations which took part in the primary discussions at Dumbarton Oaks were the nations which now bear, and have borne, the principal burden of the war makes it natural, and indeed inevitable, that Great Britain, the Soviet Union, the United States, and China should have taken primary responsibility for the initiation of

these Proposals, as they have been obliged to take primary responsibility for the prosecution of the war.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, however, were incomplete. They had to be supplemented in several important respects. This was one of the great accomplishments of the Crimea Conference.

The voting procedure agreed upon at the Crimea Conference is a procedure, as I stated to the inter-American conference two days ago, which recognizes "the two essential elements of a successful world organization—unity of action by the great powers who alone have the military and industrial strength to prevent aggression; and the equal sovereignty of all nations, large and small, who must act together to create the essential conditions of lasting peace".

Once the world Organization is established and measures for social and economic welfare are undertaken, the true democracy of the Organization of the world for peace will become apparent.

It is to put before the people of the United States the facts about the proposed world Organization that the Department of State has undertaken this series of broadcasts. I like to think that our people for the next few weeks will study, discuss, and reflect on these Proposals which are so significant to the destiny of all mankind. It is my belief, and the belief of my colleagues in the Department, that our duty in this regard is to put the facts before the country, and let the facts speak for themselves. This is the democratic method. It is the only method that will be acceptable to our people.

Here in Mexico City we have sought to support that democratic method by offering a resolution which declares the right of peoples to have free access to information. In this way, and only in this way, will truth, the enemy of tyranny, assert itself for the freedom and security of mankind.

ANNOUNCER: This is NBC in Washington. This is the first of a new series of programs on "Our Foreign Policy", arranged by NBC's University of the Air. (*Pause*) "What *is* America's foreign policy?" A lot of people have

expressed ideas on this subject, but for an authoritative answer, NBC's University of the Air calls on the Department of State. Now—Assistant Secretaries of State Archibald MacLeish and Dean Acheson.

MacLeish: This is Archibald MacLeish. The primary purpose of this program is to provide answers to questions. The Department of State receives a great many questions every day. Some of them come in by letter to the Department. Some are asked in newspaper editorials, or by radio commentators. Some come out of public meetings. Most of them are questions which can and should be answered. The Department of State, believing that a foreign policy is only as good as the people's support of it, and therefore the people's understanding of it, is very happy indeed to accept the offer of the National Broadcasting Company to put the principal officers of the Department on the air where they can speak to anyone who cares to listen. We will make no attempt to dramatize or dress up this program in any way. The people who speak to you will be the responsible officers of the Department, and what they say will be precisely what they think. My job will be to put the questions—making myself for that purpose what you might call, if not a public prosecutor, at least a public interrogator. The questions with which we will begin are questions now before us for answer in one form or another. As this series goes on, there will undoubtedly be questions asked from the floor—from the radio audience—from Americans at home and overseas—and these, too, we will attempt to answer, in so far as they can be answered in as large and open a meeting as this.

This evening, I have Dean Acheson here at the microphone. Dean Acheson is the senior Assistant Secretary, having served in the Department now for four years. At one time he was Under Secretary of the Treasury. I'd like to begin with a question that goes to the heart of the Department's work—its reason for existence: A question we are sometimes asked with a certain inflection in the public prints. The question is, "Have we *got* a

foreign policy?" That is a question you must have been thinking about off and on these last five years, Dean. What do you say to it?

ACHESON: Well, I suppose what you mean by that question is what a man means when he asks: "Do we know where we're going from here and how to get there?" One thing we all know: We don't like it where we are.

MACLEISH: In the midst of a tough war, you mean?

ACHESON: All wars are tough—this one was touch and go for quite a while. And though we know we are going to win it now, we still have the hardest fighting ahead. Anyway, we know we don't like it where we are, and we don't want to be in the same spot again. But what you have to remember when you think about all this in terms of foreign policy is that we have been in this particular spot quite a few times before.

MACLEISH: You mean, we've been at war before?

ACHESON: I mean we have been in wars before which were started by other people. If you take a good look at our history, you will find that we have been in this particular spot almost every time a major war has started. We have been right in the middle of it. You name any really big war that has gone on in this world for 200 years and see if we haven't been in it.

MACLEISH: That would seem to add up to quite an indictment of our foreign policy.

ACHESON: Not at all. It is merely to state one of the facts of life. Great wars always have and always must involve us, because one side or the other wants to do something which affects us. When the European powers fought during our early history they wanted to conquer portions of this continent. In the last two world wars the aggressor nations wanted to deal with the other free nations first and then issue their orders to us, but they couldn't wait to finish the others before attacking us.

MACLEISH: What do you say those facts of life mean in terms of foreign policy?

ACHESON: Well, first, there's the fact that we have some 50 independent nations on this globe,

each with different traditions, interests, and resources. Each of these nations, regardless of its size and power, is a sovereign nation. Another important fact of international life is that we in the United States live not on the far edge, but right smack in the middle, of this community of some 50 independent nations—and therefore what they do affects us.

MacLeish: That sounds pretty simple and elementary.

Acheson: And so it is. But unless I am entirely mistaken it is the bedrock explanation of why American foreign policy has got to be directed in one of two ways: either toward organized international cooperation, or toward aggressive imperialistic militarism.

MacLeish: Would you mind explaining that in more detail?

Acheson: Well, what I mean is this: We don't want to go through life as a nation or as individuals always living either in the middle of or on the edge of a brawl. And if you have some 50 nations who are laws unto themselves there are broadly two choices: either try to organize the community to get order by agreement, or become strong enough yourself to *impose* your particular brand of order by force on others. The Romans, earlier, and the Germans and Japanese, more recently, have tried the second choice. It doesn't seem to have worked for them, and I am certain we would be even worse at it simply because we haven't been bred to it as individuals or as a nation. But up to recent years, I don't believe we as a nation faced up to the fact that, this being a world of alternatives, our alternative was to base our foreign policy on organized international cooperation.

MacLeish: What do you mean by a foreign policy based upon organized international cooperation?

Acheson: Like anything else it's best defined in terms of what it means in action. In practice it means reaching agreement with other nations. I guess that's the literal meaning of "cooperation"—doing things together. And those "things" range

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anywhere from settling a border problem with one other neighboring nation to such things as the projected collective action of all the United Nations at the San Francisco conference in April in establishing an organization to maintain peace. We must not fool ourselves; there's nothing easy about a foreign policy of organized international cooperation. It is usually a torturingly difficult process, but in very plain language it's our best bet.

MacLeish: I think most of us realize by now that we've got to have such a policy, that we can't stay on the sidelines and depend on blindfold and fancy devices to keep us out of wars.

Acheson: Yes, we know now that neutrality acts, and cash-and-carry acts, and Johnson acts won't save us from wars that break out in other parts of the earth. We can't keep out of these wars because each one of them, if it is allowed to go on, sooner or later comes to *us*. Somebody wants to do something to us—such as drawing our teeth so that we can't be a factor in the war. Or he may want what we have. Or he may not like our ideas and our institutions. Anyhow, in the end, as history has proved to us now, every first-class war sooner or later comes to us. We can't keep out of it—at least we can't keep out of it and be the kind of people we are.

MacLeish: That adds up to saying that our foreign policy has a good deal to do with the kind of people we are.

Acheson: Obviously. For example, we in this country are a lot of inveterate individualists. We want to be ourselves. We don't want other people bossing us around. We are energetic people. We like to do things. We like to go around digging in the ground and seeing the results of our work. We are busy people. We like to see things happen. But, most of all, we are individualists. And for that reason, we love freedom—freedom to be ourselves. Maybe we could accomplish a lot more if we organized ourselves like ants. But we'd rather be free. That is the way we are and that is the way we will stay.

MacLeish: And being that sort of people, we have a passionate attachment to certain beliefs—

beliefs such as fair play and democracy. What people *believe* in makes them what they *are*. The Nazis and some Americans, too, like to say that we don't know what we're fighting for. Well, it is true that we don't have a neat, well-packaged, universally accepted set of national objectives. Only under a tyranny do you have that kind of unanimous agreement, and then it's only on the surface. But we do know what we believe in. Our strength as a nation lies in that fact. And our enemies have had an opportunity to discover what that strength amounts to.

ACHESON: Yes, we've managed to outfight them, and outgeneral them, and outlast them. That has been quite a surprise to the Nazis and the Japanese militarists who were so contemptuous of us a few years ago.

MACLEISH: What they don't understand, what they will never understand, is the strength of the basic American belief in the people. The idea of the people—of the dignity and responsibility of the people—is the idea we pioneered in the days of the American Revolution and have never forgotten. That revolutionary idea has never been stronger than it is today, for it has proved itself today in the ultimate test of battle. The Fascists and the Nazis put it in issue, and the issue has been decided, is being decided—against the Fascists and the Nazis and the rest of the pretenders.

ACHESON: I'm going to be a little less philosophical, if you don't mind, and more specific. I'd rather get down to cases. We don't think there is anything in big people kicking the stuffing out of little people—therefore we are all for the underdog. The American is always for him. When people get kicked around, we don't like it. We are against all sorts of strong-arm tactics. We don't think brutality is the sign of greatness. We want a world that is free from bullies going around and beating people up and taking things away from them, or making them do what they don't want to do. And we want a world that is open to a busy, energetic life. Our foreign policy is to make that kind of a world.

MACLEISH: So we have a foreign policy?

ACHESON: Obviously.

MACLEISH: And I take it you think our foreign policy is related to the opinions of our people. Let's get down to cases on that too. The people clearly disapproved of Japan's aggression in Manchuria and Italy's in Ethiopia, and Italy's and Germany's in Spain. Did our foreign policy also disapprove?

ACHESON: The people may have disapproved but they didn't really think that these things affected them. The people as a whole didn't realize the danger that confronted us until 1939—or, rather, until the fall of France in 1940. When we saw the Germans overrunning western Europe, we were ready to start helping Britain and the democracies, even at the risk of getting into the war ourselves. We slowly began to realize we'd have to fight alone, sooner or later, if we didn't help to save our friends and potential allies. Now we are in it, and our main thought is to get it over and keep it from happening again.

MACLEISH: How much difference is there between foreign policy and domestic policy from the point of view of public opinion? Do you think that foreign policy lags behind public opinion more than domestic policy?

ACHESON: I think there is no difference. Foreign policy is not a thing apart. Foreign policy in a democracy is merely the expression of the people's purpose with reference to matters outside the nation, whereas domestic policy is concerned with matters inside the nation. Both kinds of policy must reflect the nation's purpose. The basic policy of this nation at home and abroad is to keep the way open for our kind of life—the life of free men and women working out their own salvation and respecting the right of other people to do the same.

MACLEISH: You might say that American policy, foreign as well as domestic, is to keep the future open—to keep *our* kind of future open.

ACHESON: Sounds a little poetic to me.

MACLEISH: That doesn't necessarily mean it isn't true.

ACHESON: I'd like to approach it from another

angle—what a foreign policy is *not*. I think it might clear up some confusion to do that. For one thing, our foreign policy is *not* cloak-and-dagger diplomacy. Foreign policy may—ought to—reflect self-interest, national interest, but it is not a device to enable us to put it over on the other fellow. A lot of people who upbraid us these days for not having a strong foreign policy are really upbraiding us for not slapping our Allies across the face. Some of them seem to think that, unless you quarrel with your friends, you don't have a mind of your own.

MacLeish: I would guess that another thing that a foreign policy is *not* is a file system of plans for every contingency. You can't push a button or look in a card file under "A" and find the answers to all the questions on Afghanistan, Albania, and Australia. Foreign policy, as the word policy indicates, is really a set of general objectives. How you obtain those objectives depends on the situation at a given place and time.

Acheson: And we might name a few specific policies which have been our main objectives at certain times and places—the Monroe Doctrine; the good-neighbor policy; the open-door in China; lend-lease to our Allies in this war; Dumbarton Oaks.

MacLeish: You said at the beginning, Dean, that the real question of foreign policy is "Where do we go from here, and how do we get where we want to go?" Well, how *do* we get where we want to go from where we are? We know we want peace. We know we want security. We know we want a sort of international freedom of opportunity. How do we get them?

Acheson: The great majority of Americans want to join as soon as possible a world organization to preserve the peace.

MacLeish: I'd say that that objective was reflected in the decisions of the Crimea Conference, wouldn't you?

Acheson: Yes, the results of that Conference were in complete harmony with American opinion. That explains why the Conference was so widely acclaimed. The Conference declaration showed

that we and our Allies can get together on controversial issues. It showed that if we place unity first we can reach a compromise with some concessions from each side. And I think there was a great feeling of relief that our plans for post-war world organization will go forward while the war is still on. That's very important—to get things settled now, so that trouble won't begin to develop among the Allies.

MacLeish: What in your opinion was the most important feature of the Yalta agreement?

Acheson: From a long-range viewpoint, I should say the completion of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals by agreement on voting procedures in the proposed Security Council, and the agreement on the treatment of Germany. These are powerful factors in the building of an enduring peace. But for the immediate future, the decision on the Polish question was a great achievement. It will help a lot in settling this important question.

MacLeish: Some writers have taken exception to the terms of the Polish decision. To read them you'd think Poland had been sold down the river.

Acheson: I don't think that's typical of more than a small minority. Most of the press comment I've seen is to the effect that it's a very fair arrangement. The Crimea Conference came to an agreement that the eastern frontier of Poland should be based upon the Curzon Line.

MacLeish: Yes, and it was more or less an accident of history that this was not the boundary of Poland after World War I. In 1919, at the Versailles conference, Allied representatives, including American representatives, felt that a Polish frontier, based generally on the Curzon Line, would be desirable. They found that to the east of this Line the population was predominantly Russian and Ukrainian, while to the west of it the population was predominantly Polish.

Acheson: That's right, and today the Curzon Line generally represents the same division of peoples. Moreover, such variation as there may be from the Curzon Line under the Crimean agreement will favor the Poles. The Crimean agreement also provides that the new Polish Govern-

ment will include Polish patriots outside the country, and this is to be done by a commission in which the Soviet Union will have one representative, Foreign Minister Molotov—and the United States and Britain one each—our Ambassadors to Moscow. Second, the new provisional government will hold free elections with a secret ballot and universal suffrage. That also looks like a fair and reasonable arrangement.

MacLeish: What about Greece? The Greek situation has also been a storm center. We've had plenty of mail about that.

Acheson: Fortunately, that issue seems well on the way to being solved. The fighting has stopped over there. There is no question about the right of the Greeks to govern themselves and to hold free elections. Under the Yalta agreement, the three major powers will consult, if necessary, and joint action will be taken to guarantee democratic rights to the Greeks. The same applies to every liberated country, for the period of the transition to peace.

MacLeish: And the terms for Germany?

Acheson: The people who are most *unhappy* about the Crimea Conference are the Germans. They don't like the results because their last chance of splitting the Allies away from each other is gone. The game is up. The military leaders of our three countries will coordinate their final offensives more closely than ever, and we have served notice that not only Nazism, but the whole German military system, goes on the scrapheap. There's no misunderstanding that! No wonder the German leaders are worked up about it.

MacLeish: The important thing is that at last we're going to take our full share of responsibility in building the peace, everywhere in the world. A small minority may call this "meddling"; but I think this policy will be generally approved, because the Americans believe in standing by their principles.

Acheson: It will be a good guaranty that we are not fighting this war for nothing.

MacLeish: But there is one more thing that I think should be emphasized here: Permanent peace

is more than a matter of political organization. It's more than a matter of economic prosperity. It's also a matter of ideals—moral and spiritual values—without which we cannot have true peace. The ultimate sanction of an effective world organization, after all, will be the faith we—the United Nations—have in each other's moral sincerity.

ACHESON: But look here, Archie, you've been asking all the questions. Let *me* ask *you* one: What do *you* think is the most important thing about the Crimea Conference declaration?

MACLEISH: To me the most satisfying thing is the fact that we are now at last well on the road to a permanent international organization. This time we're not waiting for a peace conference to set up the machinery. We made that mistake last time. We tried to run the war and the peace last time in two sections, and it didn't work. This time we're acting at the high tide of victory. We are determined to carry it through to success. That's the best insurance I know against World War III.

ACHESON: It all comes back to this: A country's foreign policy, like its domestic policy, stems from its national interests. The things we want most are peace from now on, and to see democracy grow in the world, and a chance to get around and see things and build things, here and abroad. That explains why the Crimea Conference report was so well received. It is obviously in line with our objectives and takes us a long way toward peace and security. Most people sense this, I think, and so they are happy about it.

MACLEISH: We started with the question: "Have we *got* a foreign policy?" I'd like to try to see whether we have arrived at an answer.

ACHESON: Go ahead.

MACLEISH: Well, your first reply, as I understood it, was that any nation, living as we do in the midst of some 50 different and independent nations, has two choices if it wishes an orderly world—to impose its brand of order on the world by force or to try to get the world to organize itself by agreement. As between these two alternatives,

you thought the only workable choice for us was the second.

ACHESON: Right. We will either get order by organized international cooperation, or we won't get it.

MACLEISH: All right. And you concluded that we do have a foreign policy so far as this choice is concerned—that it is our policy to try to bring about the necessary international organization.

ACHESON: Yes. We have learned that we can't get by with substitutes and devices such as we tried in the years between the wars.

MACLEISH: But you felt, as I understood you, that our foreign policy was something more than a necessary choice between two alternatives—that it was positive also—that it reflected the kind of people we are.

ACHESON: That's right. Our foreign policy is to make the kind of world our kind of people *can* live in and want to live in—people who like to be themselves and to be free and to get around and to build, to accomplish things.

MACLEISH: Then you made another point. You thought foreign policy and domestic policy were the same thing, as far as their relation to public opinion was concerned—that both kinds of policy must reflect the nation's purpose.

ACHESON: And we agreed that the Crimea Conference is a good example of foreign policy reflecting national purpose.

MACLEISH: We did. The Yalta communiqué reads like an answer to the questions which have been bothering the people most: what to do with Germany—how to pave the way for democratic governments in Poland, Greece, and other liberated countries.

ACHESON: You have forgotten the best news of all—that the British, the Russians, and ourselves agreed on the answer to the most difficult question left open at Dumbarton Oaks—the question of voting procedure.

MACLEISH: At the risk of seeming to philosophize again, I'd sum it all up by saying that we agree we have a foreign policy, that it is a foreign policy that works, and that the fundamental pur-

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pose is to keep the way open for the democratic future in which this Nation believes.

Next week, in the second of these programs, I'll have with me at the microphone Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew, and probably Alger Hiss, who was secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference and who recently returned from the Crimea Conference. We will talk about *Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks.* We'll delve a little deeper into our peace plans and proposals, then. Until next week, good-by.

ANNOUNCER: That was Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Public and Cultural Relations. With him was Assistant Secretary Dean Acheson, who is in charge of congressional relations and international conferences.

This was the first of a series of programs on our foreign policy, arranged by NBC's University of the Air, both for listeners at home and for service men and women overseas, to be transmitted to them, wherever they are stationed, through the Armed Forces Radio Services. Six more programs will feature top officials of the Department of State, on the following subjects:

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals,
World Trade and World Peace,
What About the Liberated Areas?
What About the Enemy Countries?
Our Good Neighbors in Latin America, and
The State Department Itself.

Questions are invited on any or all of these subjects. Just send them to the State Department in Washington and we'll get as many answers for you as we can.

A pamphlet containing all of the seven broadcasts of this series in which State Department officials are participating will be supplied to you upon request. You should address your request to the Department of State, Washington 25, D. C. Separate copies of this evening's program alone are also available upon request.

Next Saturday at the same time you will hear a program entitled *Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks.* Archibald MacLeish will be back, this time

with Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs of the State Department. Be sure to be on hand when they answer such questions as these:

Voice No. 1: What has all this talk about Dumbarton Oaks got to do with me?

Voice No. 2: How can you expect any world organization to work with so much power politics going on?

Voice No. 3: What about the small nations: Where do they come in?

ANNOUNCER: These are questions we've got to answer. For we all have a part to play in *Building the Peace.* Yes—the war is still to be won—and we're winning it—but this time we must win the peace too!

Until next week at the same time, then. This is NBC in Washington.

Main Street and Dumbarton Oaks

Participants

JOSEPH C. GREW
Acting Secretary of State

ARCHIBALD MACLEISH
Assistant Secretary of State

ALGER HISS
Director, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State

KENNEDY LUDLAM
Announcer for NBC

Voice No. 1: What has all this talk about "winning the peace" got to do with me?

Voice No. 2: What is this Dumbarton Oaks plan? It is any different from the old League of Nations?

Voice No. 3: Are they trying to set up some sort of superstate?

ANNOUNCER: (*Pause*) These are questions which can and should be answered. NBC's University of the Air brings you answers to them, and to other questions, from the nation's foremost authorities on international affairs—namely, top-ranking officials of our State Department itself.

This is the second of seven broadcasts on the problems of *Building the Peace*, as part of a larger series on "Our Foreign Policy" arranged by the University of the Air. At a time when we must prepare for peace, NBC brings United States foreign policy closer to Americans everywhere by this series, arranged as a public service for Americans at home and, through facilities of the Armed Forces Radio Services, for our service men and women overseas.

Tonight's program, like all those featuring Department of State officials, is under the chairmanship of Assistant Secretary of State Archibald

MacLeish. With Mr. MacLeish are Under Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew and Alger Hiss, who has just been appointed Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs. Mr. Grew was Secretary-General of the American Delegation at the Peace Conference of 1919. Both Mr. Grew and Mr. Hiss attended the Dumbarton Oaks meetings. Mr. Hiss has just returned from the Crimea Conference. And now—

MacLeish: This is Archibald MacLeish. Those of you who heard last week's program in this series know how these broadcasts are run. I act as a kind of public interrogator, putting questions which have been asked the State Department, either by letter—we get thousands a week—or in the press or otherwise. The answers are provided by responsible officers in the Department, who speak as such. I have here Mr. Joseph C. Grew who is Acting Secretary of State at the moment and Mr. Alger Hiss who was Secretary of the Dumbarton Oaks conference last September. We are going to talk about the proposals for a world organization. These are known as the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals because they were worked out at a conference of American, British, Russian, and Chinese delegates who met last September at a historic old mansion here in Washington called Dumbarton Oaks. We are going to talk, specifically, about the relation of these Proposals to people everywhere in this country—to people in Seattle and Indianapolis and Atlanta and Hartford—to every Main Street, and every other street in America, and to every farm and every village and every city block.

The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are important for a number of reasons. First, they are Proposals for united action to keep the peace—to accomplish the thing you and I—and 12 million American service men and women and their 120-odd million fellow countrymen here at home—hope for so eagerly. Moreover, the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals are the first proposals ever drafted by a number of nations for submission to the peoples of the world—to the parliament of mankind—for discussion and debate. They constitute therefore

the highest point yet reached in international democracy. They are before you for discussion and debate now. In seven weeks, on April 25th, they will be submitted to the representatives of the United Nations at a conference in San Francisco. What will happen at San Francisco will depend, in large part, on what *you* think of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals—you and your neighbors and the people in the next town and the next—you overseas in the Army, or on shipboard, or wherever you are—all of you. I am going to begin by asking Mr. Grew to summarize the basic principles underlying the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals. Mr. Secretary—

GREW: I don't think I can do better, Mr. MacLeish, than to cite the four principles outlined by Secretary of State Stettinius. They are:

One: Peace can be maintained only if the peace-loving nations of the world band together for that purpose. In doing so, they have to recognize that each state has a right to a voice in the affairs of the family of nations; but also that nations are not equal in their power to prevent war.

Two: War can be prevented only if the great powers employ their dominant physical power justly and in unity of purpose to that end. Hence the prominence given to the Security Council, in which the United States, Great Britain, and the Soviet Union, China, and France would hold permanent seats.

Three: To prevent and suppress wars is not enough. If we are to have lasting peace, we have to build peace. Hence the need for a General Assembly which, as the highest representative body in the world, will extend the rule of law in international relations, and advance the material and cultural welfare of all men.

Four: As peace becomes more secure, armaments can and should be reduced progressively on a world-wide basis.

MACLEISH: In a mailbag of hundreds of letters a day, one of the commonest questions we get is this one: Does the Organization planned at Dumbarton Oaks differ from the League of Nations

in any important respects? Is it any more likely to succeed than the League?

GREW: If you don't mind, I think that first we ought to go into the structure of the proposed United Nations set-up. Alger Hiss can summarize it very well.

MACLEISH: Fine, Alger, go ahead.

HISS: First, as Mr. Grew has said, there will be the General Assembly, with an equal voice and vote for all nations, whose main task will be to promote international cooperation in all fields. Second, the Security Council will be responsible for maintaining international peace and security. It will have five permanent members—the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and France—and six members to be elected periodically by the Assembly. This Council will have the power to act promptly and decisively when necessary to preserve or restore peace.

MACLEISH: The Security Council will be on the job all the time then, in order to prevent conflicts, or to deal with them when they arise.

HISS: Yes. Then there will be a Court of International Justice to settle legal disputes between nations. And, of course, there will be a permanent secretariat, run according to the best standards of a civil service. Finally, an economic and social council, acting under the authority of the General Assembly, would deal with international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems; promote respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms; and help coordinate the activities of special international organizations in such fields as trade and finance, labor, agriculture, education, culture, health, and the like.

MACLEISH: Now that you've covered the organizational framework, I'd like to come back to my previous question: What's the difference between the League of Nations and the proposed United Nations Organization? That seems to be an important question, judging from the number of times it comes to us. People say that the League didn't do so well when it came to preventing World War II. It makes them skeptical.

GREW: One answer is the simple answer that we weren't in the League and that it is proposed we shall be in the United Nations Organization. If we had been in the League, the League would have had a chance.

MACLEISH: I agree, but what about the differences between the League and this Organization in terms of structure, Mr. Hiss?

HISS: Well, to begin with, a unanimous decision by all the members of the Council won't be necessary to label an aggressor this time. Another major point of difference is that we, and every other nation joining the United Nations Organization, would obligate ourselves to settle our disputes only by peaceful means and not by force. There was no such clear and unequivocal statement about the use of force in the League Covenant.

Furthermore, we and all other nations would agree in advance to supply armed force, in the form of national contingents, to back up the decisions of the Security Council.

MACLEISH: In other words, the new Organization is being given teeth.

HISS: Yes. The League had no armed forces that it could call upon—neither an international police force nor national contingents available for instant use. The Dumbarton Oaks Proposals would put extensive forces at the disposal of the Organization.

MACLEISH: But what other types of positive action could be taken?

HISS: The Proposals provide also for the enforcement of peace by non-military measures, such as diplomatic pressure, and economic sanctions.

MACLEISH: But the League called for such sanctions against Italy when she invaded Ethiopia, and they didn't work.

HISS: True. But there were reasons why that attempt failed—and we have learned some lessons from them. First, some of the great powers weren't willing to impose those sanctions against Italy. Second, there was no certainty that force would be used to back them up, and Mussolini

knew it. This time the Organization would be prepared to use force if necessary. But the very fact that military force is ready, in the background, may make it unnecessary to use force at all.

MacLeish: A great many people want to know this: How will the small nations come out in the proposed set-up?

Grew: I can say this: The small powers are quite able to speak for themselves, and they do and will. They are interested primarily in the creation of a strong and effective organization which will save them from war.

MacLeish: But it is obvious, of course, that the Proposals recognize a difference between the strong military powers and other nations by giving the major powers permanent seats on the Security Council.

Grew: They recognize that there is a difference, yes. They face up to the facts. To face up to the fact that certain powers are stronger than others in a military and industrial sense does not mean that an unfair distinction is made among the powers. On the contrary, as the Secretary of State said at Mexico City, the purpose of the proposed organization is to put the military strength of the great powers at the service of all the nations for the keeping of the peace.

Hiss: Then, too, the small nations *are* safeguarded. They will have six representatives out of eleven in the Security Council. In the General Assembly all nations will have one vote each and be members on a basis of sovereign equality. Also, they will enjoy full equality in the Economic and Social Council.

MacLeish: There's one more thing that I think you should go into here. It is one of our most frequent questions. Why was the idea of an international police force abandoned? Why was the system of national contingents—that is, specific units of each nation's army allocated to the Security Council—chosen for the enforcement of peace, rather than some form of international police force? Alger, what was the background of that?

Hiss: Well, first of all, under modern conditions an effective military force has got to have a national basis in terms of munitions, equipment, training, discipline, tactics, and everything else. The people who conferred at Dumbarton Oaks felt that an international police force, if widely distributed, would have difficulty maintaining its effectiveness and its morale. It would also lack the opportunity that a national force has for training. If, on the other hand, it were concentrated at one point, it would not be promptly available wherever needed. The military experts of the four powers at Dumbarton Oaks concluded that you would get the best results by depending on contingents allocated by the peace-loving powers, some of which would presumably be near by any potential trouble spot, rather than by an international police force.

MacLeish: Here's another question that often comes up: Just how would the system of national contingents operate to stop an aggressor? Will you speak to that, Mr. Grew?

Grew: Before I answer that I'd like to emphasize that force would only be used as a last resort, if and when conciliation of all sorts had failed. I agree with Alger Hiss that the knowledge that such national forces would be immediately available would be the important thing. With that in the background, the Security Council could call upon parties to a dispute to negotiate or arbitrate with every expectation of settling the trouble that way.

MacLeish: I'm sure we'd all agree to that. But what I'm getting at is: How would the system work if we should ever have to use it? Can you give us a line on that?

Grew: Well, if the dispute were not settled by peaceful means, and if the failure to settle it constituted a threat to international peace, the Security Council would decide what measures to take next. There are many non-military measures that could be taken. For example, trade and communications could be cut off, postal and telegraphic service interrupted, or financial relations broken off, to cite only a few ways of putting pressure on

an aggressor nation. If the Council decided that these were not enough, then military measures would have to be taken.

MacLeish: Let's be specific. Suppose a member of the Organization runs amuck and attacks another country, as Japan attacked Manchuria in 1931, and suppose that all possible diplomatic and economic pressures had been used, without forcing the aggressor country to pull out. How would the system of national contingents, that is, military forces at the disposal of the United Nations, have worked out then?

Grew: That is a difficult question, Archie. Just how it would work in a specific case would depend in part on the Military Staff Committee of the Security Council. This Committee, composed of the Chiefs of Staff of the major powers, and of other powers as necessary, would devise the strategy. If I might hazard a guess, though, I'd say that if such a situation were to arise again, as it did in 1931, the air resources of the pooled United Nations forces would be called into play. Perhaps Chinese, American, and other nearby air contingents would be used, if the Japanese started trouble again in Manchuria. They would stop the aggressor on the spot. Ground and naval forces would then move in immediately, if that were necessary.

MacLeish: Suppose there should be a revolution within some country or colony. Would that be considered a cause for intervention by the Security Council?

Grew: Certainly, the Security Council would act if it considered that such a revolution threatened international peace. There is no doubt in my mind that the Security Council would act if we were faced again by the kind of situations that arose in Germany and in Italy under Hitler and Mussolini before the war. And this time we would take action before a war can get started.

MacLeish: That's clear enough. We've learned a great lesson in this war—that democracy and Fascism cannot live together. We'll have no more truck with Nazism and Fascism. No more appeasing of Hitlers and Mussolinis.

GREW: That's the general idea, though you have hardly stated it in the traditional language of diplomacy. Former Secretary of State Hull, to whom we owe so much for guiding this country along the path toward international cooperation, said it this way:

"We have moved from a careless tolerance of evil institutions to the conviction that free governments and Nazi and Fascist governments cannot exist together in this world because the very nature of the latter requires them to be aggressors and the very nature of free governments too often lays them open to treacherous and well-laid plans of attack."[1]

MACLEISH: There's another important part of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals which isn't clear to the public, I gather from our mail. I mean the proposed Economic and Social Council. This "Council of 18" is something entirely new, and yet it has received much less attention than the Security Council. I wonder if it may not prove just as important, Mr. Secretary?

GREW: I'm glad you raised that question, Mr. MacLeish. It is natural that during a war which was caused by brazen aggression on the part of our enemies, people should be interested above all in those parts of the Proposals which aim at making any such aggression impossible in the future. Yet it would be a grave error to underestimate the importance of those provisions in the Proposals which are to open the way for closer international cooperation in the economic and social, and related fields. After all, cut-throat competition in international trade, starvation wages, unstable currencies, and similar economic and social ills can easily develop into menaces to world peace, if we let them. As I see it, from the very first day of its existence the proposed Organization could devote its best energies to dealing with those problems before they can cause trouble. In the new Organization, this will be done through the General Assembly and its subsidiary, the Economic and Social Council.

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[1] *Department of State Bulletin* of Apr. 15, 1944, p. 335.

MacLeish: In other words, we are not merely policing the old world. We are doing more than that. We are creating a new world. Do you agree to that, Mr. Secretary? A great many millions of Americans seem to believe the answer must be "Yes". But some Americans seem to fear they will be laughed at if they say so.

Grew: I think the answer is "Yes." I think we all believe that we *must* build a new world system.

Hiss: And the Economic and Social Council is the economic general staff for the planning of that future better world. I see no reason to be afraid of admitting that the people of the world are determined to build something better in the future than they have had in the past.

MacLeish: Certainly it is a strange thing for Americans to be afraid of admitting. Americans have always believed in the future. So far as I can judge, they still do. The timorous voices speak only for themselves. But to get back to the Organization, Mr. Hiss—where does this economic and social general staff for the planning of the future fit in?

Hiss: It serves the General Assembly, which will formulate the policies of cooperation among the member states. The Economic and Social Council—that is, the economic and social general staff—will serve the General Assembly. The Council will be made up of 18 member states, and it will use outstanding experts to make studies of economic and social problems.

MacLeish: To make studies?

Hiss: And to indicate to the world possible courses of action in the solution of common problems.

Grew: I think you should make it clear that the Economic and Social Council does something more than that. It will coordinate, under the General Assembly, the activities of a number of specialized economic and social organizations which either exist already or which may be created. The International Labor Office is an example. The United Nations Organization on Food and Agriculture is another.

HISS: Then, you have the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development. In other words, the general staff—the Economic and Social Council—will work closely with all these operating agencies.

MACLEISH: But you still haven't answered my question. Will the Assembly and the Economic and Social Council deal with real issues, real problems, or will they just hire a lot of experts to "study" questions and issue research reports in four volumes several years later?

GREW: The United Nations Organization would be what we make it—no more, no less. There is no reason why the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council should not become the most powerful instruments in the world for the promotion of human welfare.

MACLEISH: The people who write in to us are interested in men and women as well as economics. As you know, Mr. Secretary, a world-wide "bill of rights" has been proposed by several civic and religious groups in this country; and a Protestant Church Conference out in Cleveland, while backing the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, asked that the projected Organization include a commission on "human rights and fundamental freedoms." What is the prospect for developing a world-wide "bill of rights" under the Charter of the United Nations Organization? And what about a world-wide guarantee of freedom of information?

GREW: Well, the United Nations Declaration itself endorsed the eight points of the Atlantic Charter. That is a good beginning. It might be expanded by adding a declaration on the freedom of information and other things.

MACLEISH: Declarations of intent are admirable, but shouldn't the new Organization go further than that?

GREW: You are quite right, Mr. MacLeish. The General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council would have to find additional ways of insuring human freedom. They could appoint a special commission to work on the problem, which obviously can't be solved overnight; perhaps the Assembly would adopt a bill of basic human

rights; or a treaty might be negotiated, under which the signatory states agree to respect such rights as freedom of speech, of assembly, of the press, of religion. Certainly, the American Government will always be in the forefront of any international movement to widen the area of human liberty.

MacLeish: Underlying all these specific questions is one general question we hear from time to time—would the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals set up a superstate? Some writers have raised the question of American sovereignty in this connection, Mr. Grew. Will you comment on this sort of talk?

Grew: There's nothing to it. The idea of a superstate has never entered our thoughts in connection with Dumbarton Oaks. The United Nations Organization could not legislate for the United States or any other country. Of course, we'd have to undertake certain obligations to help maintain peace so that our nation could be protected from the ravages of war. We would agree to settle all of our disputes peacefully, and we must be willing to commit some of our military forces in order to prevent a new batch of international gangsters from breaking loose. But that can hardly be called a sacrifice. It's more like an insurance policy.

Hiss: "Sovereignty" has become a scare-word, but even so I'm convinced that very few Americans are worried about it in connection with the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals.

MacLeish: I agree. The word "sovereignty" appears in learned discussions and newspaper editorials, but mighty few people mention it in their letters to the Department of State.

Here's a related question: Would we have to go to war if the Security Council decided to use force against an aggressor? Would we be giving the Council a blank check?

Grew: Absolutely not—not a "blank check". First of all, the Security Council, in voting to use force to preserve or restore peace, could only call out the contingents of armed forces and the facilities which the nations would have agreed before-

hand to put at the disposal of the Organization for just such an emergency. Such action would not put us into war, but would be designed to prevent war. In the second place, the representative of the United States would naturally not act without instructions from his Government at Washington. In any case, the force of public opinion would undoubtedly make itself felt, for the public would be well informed by press and radio as they were in the hectic days of 1938 and 1939.

MacLeish: Another thing: Speakers from the State Department often get this question put to them. How would various regional agreements, such as our own inter-American system, fit into the Dumbarton Oaks security set-up? How about that, Mr. Grew?

Grew: Well, first of all, of course, the responsibility for establishing good relations rests on individual nations themselves. Any regional agreements which promoted harmony and cooperation would be all to the good. Only if they ran counter to the purpose and principles of the United Nations Organization would there be cause for objection. Certainly the Inter-American regional set-up, as we understand it, is entirely consistent with the Proposals.

MacLeish: We have received some questions in the last week or two on the relationship of the inter-American conference at Mexico City to the San Francisco conference. Can you go into that, Mr. Secretary?

Grew: There is a very real relationship between them. A lot of preliminary spade work is being done in Mexico City and may be done in other places too before the San Francisco meetings get under way next month. Such conferences are most constructive, and I believe that the work they do will speed the work to be done at San Francisco. There should be as much discussion of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals as possible, between now and when the conference opens on April 25.

MacLeish: Those who are critical of the policy which led up to the San Francisco conference are

fond of saying that we can't make an international organization work because of "power politics". This type of statement usually refers to the situations in Greece and Poland, so I suppose you consider it to be pretty controversial, Mr. Grew. But I think we should deal with it.

GREW: Yes. I'd say this: Differences, from time to time, among the United Nations are probably inevitable, but I would like to point out that these particular issues might never have arisen in an acute form if we had had the machinery to deal with them in advance. The Yalta declaration on liberated countries points the way toward close cooperation by the big powers. In the future, the United Nations Organization will provide the means of working on such problems at an early stage, and every opportunity will be given for adjustment and compromise. The friendly spirit at the Dumbarton Oaks and Crimea conferences, and the large measure of agreement reached there, are themselves a guarantee that with a permanent organization power politics can be reduced to a minimum.

MACLEISH: Now, our time is running out. Now I have collected a few more questions I'd like to get in. First, what nations will be invited to attend the conference in San Francisco?

HISS: The answer to that is to be found in the communiqué issued at the Crimea Conference. It says that the conference will be a conference of the United Nations.

MACLEISH: The neutrals won't be included?

HISS: No, they will not be invited to join at the initial conference. They may, however, be brought in later on the recommendation of the Security Council and approval of the Assembly. Eventually, even the present enemy nations will apply for admission, but I believe that they should give overwhelming evidence of their good faith and their capacity to live up to the obligations of membership before being considered at all. In other words, the burden of proof will be on them, to demonstrate that they are "peace-loving".

MACLEISH: Enthusiasts for world *federation*

are critical of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals because they think they don't go far enough.

GREW: The practical choice at this time is clearly between an organization of the type proposed at Dumbarton Oaks and international anarchy. I will say this: The present plan, by demonstrating that nations can work together to solve their problems, will prepare the way for further improvements. In any case the Charter proposed at Dumbarton Oaks would carry provisions for amendment, like our own Constitution, but I'd like to add one thing more, and I can't make this point too strongly: The choice is not between an organization along the lines of the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals and some ideal formula. It is between such an organization and *no organization at all* on a world-wide basis.

MACLEISH: You are speaking of the perfectionists, Mr. Grew. There are also, of course, the cynics who believe that because we have fought a war in every generation, we always shall. It's human nature, he says. But he forgets that the people of the United States and the people of the other United Nations did not want a war and would not have started one to expand their territory or their power. This war grew out of a vicious ingrown nationalism in Germany, Italy, and Japan. War can be eliminated if we root out its economic, social, and psychological causes, and set up a world organization to solve disputes peacefully and nip aggression in the bud. Even those Americans who think there will be future wars believe that we should at least do everything in our power to prevent them. Don't you agree, gentlemen?

GREW: Absolutely. Do the cynics want another war? Insisting on the inevitability of war is just an excuse for doing nothing to prevent it.

MACLEISH: To sum up, I think we can say that the foreign policy of the United States is directed toward securing the peace and welfare of American citizens; that peace and welfare are only possible in a just world order; and that we see in the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals the cornerstone of such an order. (*Pause*) There is one question

that I'd like to answer myself, though, before we close. It's a real question, and an important one: "What can the individual citizen, the man out there on Main Street, do to help bring about a peace organization such as we've been discussing here?" The answer is simply this: Find out about the peace Proposals. Make up your mind about them. Talk them over with your neighbors. If you want more information on the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, drop a postcard to the Department of State, and we'll see that you get a brief pamphlet on the subject.

GREW: I'd like to add a parting word, too, Archie. Whatever plan may eventually emerge from the Dumbarton Oaks Proposals, we can't afford to turn it down because it isn't perfect. We can't expect anything 100 percent to our liking. But we can be sure that plan will be a good one, entirely adequate for our purpose.

ANNOUNCER: That was Acting Secretary of State Joseph C. Grew. With him were Archibald MacLeish, Assistant Secretary of State in Charge of Public and Cultural Relations, and Alger Hiss, Director of the Office of Special Political Affairs in the Department of State. This was the second in a series of programs on "Our Foreign Policy", arranged by NBC's University of the Air. Five more programs will feature top officials of the State Department on the following subjects:

World Trade and World Peace,
What About the Liberated Areas?
What About the Enemy Countries?
Our Good Neighbors in Latin America, and
The State Department Itself.

Following that, we will broadcast two programs from the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs Committees. Questions are invited on these subjects from the general public and from our listeners in the armed forces. Send them to the Department of State in Washington. And if you wish a reprint of this entire series of broadcasts, or a copy of this particular program, just send your request to the Department of State, Washington 25, D. C.

Next week's program will be entitled *World Trade and World Peace.* Archibald MacLeish will be back, this time with Assistant Secretaries of State William Clayton and Dean Acheson to answer such questions as these:

Voice No. 1: What does the world trade mean in terms of my job?

Voice No. 2: If we import more foreign goods, will American wage standards suffer?

Voice No. 3: What about cartels?

ANNOUNCER: These questions deserve answers—for they affect our very livelihood. We'll try to answer them next week at this same time. This is NBC in Washington, the Nation's Capital.

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